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by the existence of impulses of less strength, but of wider significance, may have full weight in the guidance of your life. In other words, *be religious.*"

It is impossible, in this place, to do more than to allude to the many special discussions of living questions in religion and morals which are given in this essay, most striking because from so new a point of view. On the essay as a whole it may be remarked that evidently the psychological inquiry, which is here solely pursued, cannot speak the last word on the subject of religion. It is determinist. It knows no God but the human spirit. It recognizes and traces instinct, but can give no hint of its origin. If this essay pretends to give a complete account of religion, we cannot but be dismayed at the havoc it makes in all that religious men hold sacred, such as otherworldliness, mystery, the sanctities and the aspirations of the religious life. But it is a contribution to the psychological analysis of religion alone, and it is to be welcomed as such, since it is an earnest, serious, profound, and, we had almost said, reverent study, which must be dealt with by all who go beneath the surface, and who welcome light from all quarters upon this, the greatest of all subjects of human investigation.

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DIE SEELENTHEORIE, UND DIE GESETZE DES NATÜRLICHEN EGOISMUS UND DER ANPASSUNG. Von F. HANS PAUL. Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag, 1899. Pp. 292. M. 5.

THE author's aim is to furnish an incontestable proof, by the inductive method, that the commonly accepted belief in a divinely implanted "soul" is a myth; that the activities of the human mind, from the lowest to the highest, from the simplest to the most complex, are entirely mechanical and corporeal in their origin and nature; and that human activities differ in no respect, save in degree of complexity, from those of the lower orders of being. The highest exercise of human reflection or volition is not different in kind from that movement of a plant in a dark cellar whereby it grows up toward the solitary ray of light.

By the law of natural egoism, then, the author means that every living organism is filled with an overmastering impulse toward the maintenance of its own "integrity," and that of the species to which it belongs. This impulse is the direct consequence of *life* as such; and if it proves the presence of an intelligent soul in the case of man, then

it does also in that of the animal and the plant ; and if not in their case, then not in his.

The law of adjustment (*Anpassungsgesetz*) expresses the fact that every being is affected by its environment and responds by changes in its behavior, calculated to preserve its integrity, as stated. Natural egoism expresses itself in this reaction or adjustment against the environment, and the whole process takes place in an entirely automatic (reflex ?) and corporeal fashion. All human sagacity and wisdom, as well as all moral qualities, depend upon an inherent capacity, possessed by brain-substance as such, of adjusting itself to the environment in which it finds itself. Man's social qualities, which constitute the ground of all those complex organizations exemplified in the family, the state, and the church, are nothing other than highly developed forms of the same primal natural egoism, reacting upon the environment in accordance with mechanical law. There is nowhere any evidence of the presence of a god-like "soul," nor of the interference of a designing Creator, whether in the life of the individual, the structure of society, or the differentiating qualities of species in the animal world. All is the result of mechanical law.

The commonly alleged superiority of man in regard to intellectual and moral qualities is reduced and minimized by two lines of argument; which, though somewhat startling to those who have been accustomed to think of the absoluteness of "necessary truth" and of the "categorical imperative," are perfectly familiar to all students of ancient sophistry and modern empirical hedonism. In the first place, the author denies the existence of any absolute distinction between truth and falsehood on the one hand, and between right and wrong on the other ; basing his denial upon the wide differences in the opinions of men on these subjects. If man possessed a divinely implanted soul, we should find among men perfect certainty of conviction and complete unanimity of belief with regard to these matters. In the second place, it is pointed out that a well-trained dog possesses exactly such perceptions of truth and falsehood, and of right and wrong, as are manifested by the human animal. In both cases "right" means "that which I can do without unpleasant consequences ;" while man's supremacy in the matter of understanding, so far as it exists, is due to his possession of the instrument of language, which constitutes for him a new form of environment, highly complex, but still entirely corporeal in its nature. And speech itself is a necessary result of natural egoism.

In similar fashion all the phenomena usually attributed to the human "soul" are shown to be nothing more than the reaction of an organism, endowed with natural egoism, against the stimulations of an ever-present but constantly changing corporeal environment; and the book closes with the emphatic declaration of the complete corporeality of all that we call *soul* or *spirit*.

The attempt to reduce the spiritual to the material is by no means a new thing in the history of thought. Nor can it be said that any new arguments are advanced in the treatise under discussion. In fact, the time-worn assumptions of materialism and hedonism, that pleasure is the good, that thought is reducible to sensation, that the moral law embodies a mere hypothetical imperative, that conscience is a product of experiences as to the painful consequences of actions, etc., though they have been fully met and overthrown times without number, are here presented to us again, in some cases unaccompanied by any proof, as though Plato and Kant and Lotze had never been born. Not only so, but the author's statement of doctrines opposed to his own is often little better than a caricature. Witness the statement (p. 12) that conscience is defined by the theologians as an inner voice which teaches the individual *that he must expect to suffer in consequence*¹ of an act which is disapproved by God or society! The author would find it exceedingly difficult to name one theologian, outside the hedonist camp, who thus defines conscience. Again, it is assumed all through, without any proof whatever, that if the soul of man were divinely bestowed, all men would be exactly alike, and incapable of development, in regard to moral and intellectual powers.

Finally, it must be remarked that the author's claim to have "simplified" the matters with which he deals, is not borne out. He forbids us to believe in a soul, or in a designing Creator, as an explanation of the world and of human life; but in the place of these he gives us natural egoism, which can only be defined as "something inherent in every living organism as such." Truly, if this is an explanation, then all mysteries in heaven and earth are now capable of prompt and easy solution!

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¹ The italics are mine.